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Abstract Over the last ten years, the corporate governance context in most
Western countries has changed as a result of irregularities, increased regulation,
heightened societal expectations and shareholder activism. This paper examines the
impact of the changing context on the role of chairmen of supervisory boards in the
Netherlands. Based on a combination of thirty semi-structured interviews with
board members of leading Dutch corporations and secondary data on the position of
supervisory board chairmen at the top-100 listed firms in the Netherlands, the study
reveals that board chairmen have become increasingly involved in both their control
and service roles. While the demographics (i.e., age, tenure, gender and nationality)
of chairmen have hardly changed over the last decade, chairmen are spending
considerably more time on boards and committees, have reduced the number of
board interlocks and have become more active on the forefront of the corporate
governance discussion. The paper highlights several implications for scholars and
practitioners.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the corporate governance system in most Western countries
has changed significantly. Global mobility of capital and the spread of the Anglo-
American shareholder value model have fueled the debate on corporate governance
practices around the globe (Fiss and Zajac 2004; Ingley and Van Der Walt 2005;
Kiel and Nicholson 2003; Yoshikawa et al. 2007). Moreover, in the wake of
corporate governance scandals, financial markets have introduced stringent
corporate governance regulations such as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, EU Company
Law Directives and numerous national corporate governance codes (Aguilera and
Cuervo-Cazurra 2004; Enrione et al. 2006; Sheridan et al. 2006). A communality in
these reform initiatives has been the emphasis on (i) restoring the public’s trust and
(ii) ensuring that appropriate ‘‘checks and balances’’ are put in place in the
regulatory system and corporations (Daily et al. 2003). Among others, the rights and
duties of shareholders, the importance of financial transparency and risk manage-
ment, and the fiduciary role of auditors have been addressed and redefined in these
corporate governance reform initiatives.
Another key topic of debate has been the appropriate role of boards of directors
in changing corporate governance systems (Corley 2005; Huse 2007; Huse and
Rindova 2001). Scholars have noted that expectations for boards’ involvement in
decision-making and supervision have changed and that board roles and structures
in most Western countries are evolving as a result (Akkermans et al. 2007; Bezemer
et al. 2007; Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2007; Hillier and McColgan 2006;
Hooghiemstra and Van Manen 2004; Long 2006; Samuels et al. 1996; Valenti 2008;
Wintoki 2007). Particularly, two factors are contributing to this development. First,
multiple corporate governance reform initiatives, in line with principles of the
agency theory, are being introduced to strengthen board control and board
independence (Daily et al. 2003; Enrione et al. 2006; Finegold et al. 2007). Second,
boards of directors have come under closer scrutiny of the public and shareholder
activists (Cogut 2007; Loring and Taylor 2006; Wu 2004). As a consequence,
members of boards of directors are increasingly faced with the challenge to
‘‘demonstrate effective leadership, quality decision-making processes and the ability
to exercise corporate controls’’ (Long 2006, 547).
Whereas the influence of changing societal expectations on roles and structures at
board level is fairly well-established, the consequences for the role of individual
board members have received less scholarly attention. In this paper, we posit that, in
particular, the chairman of the board of directors may be subject to changing role
expectations, as he is most visible to the outside world (Kakabadse and Kakabadse
2007a; 2007b; Roberts 2002). Given the chairman’s responsibility for (i)
counterbalancing the power of the CEO and (ii) the functioning of the board of
directors (Hill 1995; McNulty and Pettigrew 1999), the changing role requirements
might in fact have a far-reaching impact on the checks and balances within
corporations. Yet, to date, relatively little is known about (i) contemporary
challenges for chairmen (ii) the evolution of the chairman’s role versa key
organizational bodies and individuals such as the CEO, and (iii) the drivers of the
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changing role of chairmen of boards of directors (e.g., Kakabadse et al. 2006;
Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2007a, 2007b; Roberts 2002; Roberts and Stiles 1999).
By exploring the evolving role of chairmen of boards of directors in the Dutch
context, we contribute to the literature in three ways. First, while prior research in
general has examined the impact of environmental change on the role of the board
of directors as a group, we explore its influence on the role fulfillment of the board’s
main individual actor, i.e., the chairman. Our results highlight that several
environmental developments have significantly altered the level and scope of
chairmen’ involvement and working styles. Interestingly, the opinions regarding the
performance implications of the evolving role of board chairmen vary widely within
our sample. Second, we illustrate that the changing role of board chairmen has co-
evolved with their structural position. Our empirical results illustrate that the
chairmen’ increasing responsibilities are reflected in higher levels of cash payment,
more turnover and fewer additional supervisory board positions (interlocks).
Simultaneously, the demographic profile of the chairmen (i.e., age, tenure, gender
and nationality) remained similar, suggesting a disconnection between demograph-
ics and role fulfillment. Third, while one-tier boards have been investigated quite
extensively, we provide a more thorough understanding of the challenges that board
chairmen face on two-tier boards. We illustrate that the legal separation of decision
control from decision management in two-tier boards adds an extra layer of
complexity to the changing societal expectations of board chairmen. Thereby, we
highlight the opportunities and drawbacks chairmen face while operating in
alternative board models.
The paper is structured as follows: section one describes recent developments,
the two-tier board model and reform initiatives in the Netherlands. Section two
summarizes previous research on the roles of the chairman of the board of directors
in one-tier and two-tier boards. Section three describes the research method, i.e., a
combination of 30 semi-structured interviews with CEOs and chairmen and archival
data on the structural position of chairmen in top-100 listed firms in the Netherlands.
Section four portrays the evolution of the role of the supervisory board chairman
during the period 1997–2007 and discusses the drivers and consequences of board
trends. Section five concludes with a discussion of our key empirical findings and
highlights the implications for the market for chairmen, activities of corporations,
and the viability of the two-tier board model.
2 The Dutch corporate governance system
The roots of the contemporary Dutch open-economy can be found in the glory days
of the Golden Age. In this era, when the Netherlands were one of the largest trading
nations, the Dutch founded the ‘Dutch United East India Company’, the first joint
stock company in the world. With a small group of large, internationally diversified
firms and a GDP that is dependent on foreign investment and trade (more than
60%), the Dutch trade origins and international orientation are still prominent. The
Netherlands are a welfare state with a long tradition of balancing the interests of
societal groups. The Dutch corporate governance system is unique in the sense that
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company law explicitly defines corporations as legal entities which must take into
account the rights of all stakeholders affected by the company. The institutionalized
stakeholder approach is supported by a two-tier board model consisting of a
management board and a supervisory board. The supervisory board solely consists
of non-executive directors to assure its independence and has the duty by law to
supervise and advise the management board while acting in the best interests of the
company and all stakeholders involved (Akkermans et al. 2007; De Jong et al. 2005,
2006; Hooghiemstra and Van Manen 2004; Maassen 1999; Maassen and Van Den
Bosch 1999).
Over the last decade, the corporate governance landscape in the Netherlands has
changed dramatically with the internationalization of the shareholder base of listed
firms. Particularly, the share of Anglo-American oriented investor groups (Abma
2006) and the number of foreign directors have increased (Spencer Stuart 2006a, b).
As a result, board members are more exposed to foreign investors’ corporate
governance expectations and their willingness to actively challenge boards of
directors. Examples of ‘‘successful’’ shareholder activism by foreign investors are
the ABN AMRO takeover by a consortium led by the now split up Fortis Bank, and
Stork, a Dutch technology company, where a hedge fund forced the corporation to
restructure. Corporate governance scandals (e.g., Ahold, Enron, WorldCom and
Parmalat) also have fueled the Dutch debate and contributed to amendments to the
Dutch company law in 2004 and the introduction of a new corporate governance
code, the Tabaksblat Code, in 2003, which was amended by the committee Frijns in
2008. In sum, these developments have contributed to a convergence of the
institutionalized stakeholder model and the Anglo-American shareholder model in
the Netherlands (Bezemer et al. 2007).
3 The position of chairmen on one-tier and two-tier boards
Traditionally, the primary responsibility of the board of directors has been to control
the top management team to ensure that executives act in the interests of
shareholders. The boards’ control role is rooted in agency theory and deemed
necessary for counteracting managerial opportunism that may arise as a result of the
separation of corporate ownership from management (Davis et al. 1997; Zahra and
Pearce 1989). In addition, scholars have recognized the service role of boards, i.e.,
board members may positively contribute to corporate decision-making by
providing advice and counseling to executive directors (Huse 2005, 2007; Zahra
and Pearce 1989). Both board roles appear to be conflicting as the control role
requires board independence, distance and a focus on the prevention of managerial
opportunism, while the service role requires from directors interdependence,
closeness and a focus on joint value creation (Forbes and Milliken 1999; Van Hamel
et al. 1998; Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003).
The control and service roles of boards are organized differently in corporate
governance systems around the globe. Most investors are familiar with the one-tier
board model in which executives and non-executives are jointly responsible for both
roles. In this model, executive directors provide in-depth knowledge of the daily
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operations of the corporation and may raise issues that might otherwise have been
neglected in board meetings (Davis 1991; Kesner and Johnson 1990; Muth and
Donaldson 1998). The presence of executive directors enables the board to
contribute to the decision-making process and to evaluate the outcomes (Maassen
1999; Williamson 1985) at greater speed with fewer bureaucratic hurdles (Davis
1991; Muth and Donaldson 1998). However, scholars have observed that insider
dominated boards may overlook the opportunities that outsiders may offer in terms
of alternate knowledge (Carpenter and Westphal 2001; McNulty and Pettigrew
1999; Rindova 1999) and external relationships (Boyd 1990; Mizruchi 1996; Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978; Westphal et al. 2001). Insider dominated boards may also
jeopardize checks and balances as non-executive directors may be better able to
provide independent board control (Daily et al. 2003; Sundaramurthy and Lewis
2003).
While the one-tier model integrates decision management and decision control
(Fama and Jensen 1983), the two-tier board model provides for a formal separation
of executive and non-executive directors who operate in separate boards with their
own specific roles. Executive directors are responsible for the day-to-day operations
of the firm and the supervisory board is responsible for the supervision of
management and for providing advice and counseling to executives (Christensen
and Westenholz 1999; Hooghiemstra and Van Manen 2004; Maassen and Van Den
Bosch 1999). The independence of the board from management is provided by law
to ensure that ‘‘checks and balances’’ are in place as the supervisory board has the
duty to act in the best interests of the firm and its stakeholders. Non-executives also
may bring in useful resources and knowledge. For instance, directors of banks have
always played an important role in the inter-corporate network in the Netherlands
(Heemskerk 2007). A disadvantage of the two-tier system, however, is the
additional bureaucratic burden on the corporation that may hamper the speed of
decision-making (Maassen 1999; Muth and Donaldson 1998) and create information
asymmetries among executive directors and non-executive directors (Davis 1991;
Hooghiemstra and Van Manen 2004).
Scholars have observed that chairmen of boards perform their role(s) in a wide
variety of ways in different board models (Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2007a;
Stewart 1991). However, all board chairmen are responsible for: (i) the conduct and
composition of the board (ii) determining the agenda of board meetings (iii)
appointing and dismissing the CEO (iv) chairing the annual general meeting of
shareholders and (v) ensuring that all board members have the necessary
information to perform their job (Hill 1995; McNulty and Pettigrew 1999; Roberts
and Stiles 1999). Furthermore, the chairman’s responsibility to maintain a healthy
bilateral dialogue with managing directors is often posited as critical to the
effectiveness of boards of directors and their contribution to a firm’s long-term
survival (Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2007a).
While the basic role expectations of chairmen are shared on one-tier and two-tier
boards, the differences between both board models have a significant imprint on the
role and position of chairmen. Whereas the role of board chairmen in the two-tier
model is to refrain from day-to-day management of the firm and to focus on decision
control, chairmen of one-tier boards are often actively involved in both decision
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management and decision control. Instead of being a distant monitor, board
chairmen in one-tier boards are often operating as ‘‘chairman-leader’’. Parker (1990,
35), for example, describes that the typical board chairman ‘‘entertained important
customers and shareholders; that he spoke for the company in the City and
elsewhere; and when appropriate, conducted high-level negotiations with govern-
ments and major customers’’. Accordingly, Garratt (1999, 33) argues that ‘‘CEOs
need to accept that the chairman is the boss of the board. The managing director, or
CEO, is the boss of the operations of the company’’. Furthermore, Treadwell (2006,
66) posits that the ‘‘chairman is the primary interface with the institutions along
with the CEO and the finance director’’. In sum, these studies highlight that while
board chairmen in two-tier boards are mainly responsible for ensuring that the board
of directors adequately supervises management, board chairmen on one-tier boards
more often operate at the forefront and appear to have broader responsibilities.
The different role requirements also manifest themselves in the structural
position of board chairmen. For example, in the two-tier model, chairmen cannot
hold the position of CEO or another executive position in the firm simultaneously.
However, CEO duality is not uncommon for one-tier boards (Faleye 2007;
Davidson et al. 2008; Spencer Stuart 2006a, b, 2008). Furthermore, as a result of the
supervisory board chairmen’ distance from daily management, the liabilities of
chairmen in two-tier boards are generally significantly lower compared to chairmen
who have the same legal position as executive directors. Finally, the average time
spent on a board chairmanship is significantly higher on one-tier boards as the
responsibilities generally appear to be broader than for chairmen of two-tier boards.
As a consequence, board chairmen of one-tier boards generally earn significantly
more than chairmen on supervisory boards (Spencer Stuart 2006a, b). Table 1
provides a concluding summary of the main communalities and differences between
the role and position of chairmen in both board models. In the remainder of this
paper, we will discuss how the traditional role and position of the supervisory board
chairman have evolved during the period 1997–2007 in the Netherlands.
4 Research method
To analyze the evolving role of supervisory board chairmen in the Netherlands
between 1997 and 2007, we utilize two research methods. In collaboration with
Spencer Stuart Amsterdam, thirty semi-structured interviews were held in 2007/
2008 with supervisory board chairmen and CEOs of listed firms on the NYSE
Euronext in the Netherlands (see Appendix A). As to the selection of participants,
we used convenience sampling (all interviewees were contacts of Spencer Stuart
Amsterdam), given well-known difficulties for researchers to obtain access to
individuals at this level of analysis (Daily et al. 2003; Pettigrew 1992). We
approached both supervisory board chairmen (22) and CEOs (8). We chose this
approach in order to ensure that we obtained a comprehensive overview where
CEOs might highlight other environmental developments and related changes in
role expectations of board chairmen than the chairmen. As the participants were
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asked to reflect on the developments during the period 1997–2007, we made sure
that they already had experience with supervisory boards in 1997, so that all
participants at least had a senior management position in 1997. The thirty interviews
lasted one to two hours and were conducted in the mother tongue of the interviewee
(Dutch or English). Given the sensitivity and confidentiality of the discussions, we
were not allowed to record the interviews. Notes were taken by two interviewers
and interviewees were asked to fill in a short questionnaire. Among others, directors
were asked to provide a top-3 of changes in their environments and a top-3 of
implications for the role of the supervisory board chairman.
We also collected archival data on the structural position of the chairmen of
supervisory boards of the top-100 listed companies at the NYSE Euronext in
Table 1 Role of the chairman in different board models
One-tier board model Two-tier board model
Board characteristics
Composition Executive and non-executive directors
operate in one board
Executive and non-executive directors
operate in separate boards
Committees Mandatory or recommended Recommended
Orientation Shareholder/Stakeholder oriented Stakeholder oriented
Countries Most countries, among others used in the
United Kingdom and United States
Quite uncommon. Among others used in
Germany and the Netherlands
Chairman’s characteristics
CEO Duality Possible Not possible
Independence Not necessary Required
Authority,
liability
Same (legal) position as executives Different (legal) position as executives
Tasks,
responsibilities
Co-directing Supervising
Time spent on
chairmanship
More than in two-tier board model Less than in one-tier board model
Chairman’s role
Corporate
governance
code
provisions
The chairman is responsible for leadership
of the board, ensuring its effectiveness
of all aspects of its role and setting its
agenda. The chairman is also
responsible for ensuring that the
directors receive accurate, timely and
clear information. The chairman should
ensure effective communication with
shareholders. The chairman should also
facilitate the effective contribution of
non-executive directors in particular and
ensure constructive relations between
executive and non-executive directors
(UK; Financial Reporting Council 2003,
2008)
The chairman of the supervisory board
shall ensure the proper functioning of
the supervisory board and its
committees, and shall act on behalf of
the supervisory board as the main
contact for the management board and
for shareholders regarding the
functioning of the management and
supervisory board members. In his
capacity of chairman, he shall ensure the
orderly and efficient conduct of the
general meeting (NL; Monitoring
Commission 2008)
Sources: Maassen 1999; Spencer Stuart 2006a, b and 2008; Monitoring Commission 2008; Financial
Reporting Council 2003, 2008
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Amsterdam. The companies operate in multiple industries (construction, financial
services, manufacturing, communication, wholesale and retail) and significantly
contribute to the Dutch economy. Top-100 lists were created by calculating the
average market capitalization of all corporations listed at the NYSE Euronext in
Amsterdam during a specific year. We collected data on supervisory board chairmen
for the years 1997, 2001 and 2005 in order to portray the position of chairmen at
regular time intervals. The year 1997 is a natural starting point as this was when the
first Dutch corporate governance code was published that initiated a national debate
on corporate governance and the role of supervisory boards. The data were obtained
from the Spencer Stuart Netherlands Board Indexes that contain information on
non-executive directors who occupied more than 5,000 supervisory board positions
in the Netherlands during the period 1997–2005. The data were checked and
complemented by information obtained from annual reports and the Thompson,
BoardEx and Reach databases.
To analyze the structural position of the supervisory board chairman over time,
we tracked chairmen’ demographics, network position, board activities, remuner-
ation and turnover. More specifically, we collected the following demographic
information: (i) the age in number of years (ii) the tenure in a focal firm in number
of years (iii) gender and (iv) nationality. The network position of chairmen was
mapped with (i) the number of additional board positions of a chairman at other top-
100 listed firms and (ii) the number of additional chairmanships at other top-100
listed firms in the Netherlands. To portray the board activities of chairmen, we used
two indicators for the formal involvement of chairmen in corporate decision-
making: (i) the number of chaired board meetings during a specific year and (ii) the
number of board committees they worked with during a specific year. We also
collected data on chairmen’ annual cash remuneration in Euros and turnover as the
percentage of the chairmen whose contracts expired during a specific year. Finally,
we statistically analyzed differences with independent-samples t-tests.
5 Empirical findings
Scholars and practitioners have observed that corporate governance has been in
transition over the last decade (i.e., Ingley and Van Der Walt 2005; Kiel and
Nicholson 2003). Yet, to date, relatively little is known about (i) which
environmental changes are perceived as important by supervisory board chairmen
(ii) what these developments imply for their day-to-day functioning, and (iii) how
their structural position (i.e., demographics, network position, board activities,
remuneration and turnover) has co-evolved with changes in the environment. In the
following paragraphs these aspects will be discussed.
5.1 Key developments in the Dutch corporate governance context (1997–2007)
Table 2 provides an overview of the five main trends that supervisory board
chairmen and CEOs of the largest listed firms in the Netherlands observe. The most
significant development has been the expansion of the regulatory framework,
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including the introduction of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002), the second Dutch
corporate governance code (2003) and IFRS (2005). In particular, CEOs highlight
the significance of this development. Fifty per cent of the interviewed directors refer
to the growing influence and rights of shareholders, heightened levels of shareholder
activism and an increasing focus on shareholder value in the day-to-day operations
of firms. As a third development, supervisory board chairmen (32%) and CEOs
(25%) mention the international wave of corporate governance scandals as this has
fueled the attention for corporate governance of regulatory bodies and society.
Furthermore, interviewees observe (about one quarter) the convergence of the one-
tier board model and the two-tier board model, where executives and non-
executives tend to work more intensively together than traditionally in the two-tier
model (Hooghiemstra and Van Manen 2004; Maassen 1999; Maassen and Van Den
Bosch 1999). One director even remarked that ‘‘The Anglo-Saxon one-tier board
system is in fact already the board system used by Dutch supervisory and executive
boards’’. Finally, 23% of the board chairmen mentioned that media attention for the
functioning of supervisory boards and the call for more transparency and
accountability have increased. Overall, supervisory board chairmen and CEOs
seem to observe the same key environmental changes in the Dutch corporate
governance context.
5.2 Key implications for the role of supervisory board chairmen (1997–2007)
Interviewees were asked to reflect on the implications of the changes for the
functioning of supervisory board chairmen. Table 3 provides an overview of the
most mentioned implications. First, a majority of the directors mention that
supervisory board chairmen are more in a leadership role and more visible than in the
past, while their responsibilities have broadened (implication 1). More specifically,
44% of the directors emphasize that the amount of board control has significantly
increased and that the level of discretion of executives has become more limited
(implication 3). Two supervisory board chairmen exemplified this development as
follows: ‘‘Today’s supervisory board chairman keeps the CEO more on his toes’’ and
Table 2 The changing institutional context of Dutch supervisory boards (1997–2007)
Institutional developments in the Netherlands Perceptions
chairmen (n = 22)
Perceptions
CEOs (n = 8)
1 Stronger focus on regulation and compliance (i.e.,
SOX, IFRS and the Dutch corporate governance code)
13 (66.7%) 7 (87.5%)
2 Increasing influence of (activist) shareholders and more
espousal and implementation of a shareholder value
orientation
11 (50.0%) 4 (50.0%)
3 Corporate governance scandals (i.e. Enron, Parmalat,
WorldCom and Ahold)
7 (31.8%) 2 (25.0%)
4 Increasing convergence of one-tier and two-tier boards 6 (27.3%) 2 (25.0%)
5 Increasing media attention for the functioning of
supervisory boards and societal claims for heightened
levels of transparency
5 (22.7%) 0 (0.0%)
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‘‘In today’s world, supervisory board members are supervisors rather than sparring
partners’’. Simultaneously, 27% of the board chairmen mentioned that they have
become more and earlier involved in strategic decision-making (implication 5).
Moreover, 18% of the chairmen stated that they communicate more with shareholders
and other stakeholders (implication 6). For instance, one supervisory board chairman
remarked that in particular, ‘‘there are more contacts between the chairman and
institutional investors. I am definitely more exposed than in the past’’. Supervisory
board chairmen report that they are struggling with new role expectations as these
seem to be in conflict with independent board control. Two supervisory board
chairmen observed that ‘‘capital markets expect more from the supervisory
board chairman than usual in the two-tier system’’ and put forward that ‘‘supervisory
board directors should not be afraid to step into the shoes of the CEO if necessary’’.
The changing governance context in the Netherlands is affecting the working
style of the supervisory board chairman as well. A majority of the interviewees
(63%) observe that the workload of supervisory board chairmen has significantly
increased (implication 2). Particularly, interviewees mention that the relationship
between the chairman and CEO has intensified. A chairman phrases the potential
benefit of more involvement as follows: ‘‘A one-tier supervisory directorship takes
more time. But then you will be present when all important decisions are made’’.
Furthermore, 23% of the directors remarked that the changing context has led to a
better understanding of their own role requirements and the need for more board and
personal accountability (implication 4). One chairman put it as follows: ‘‘Self-
evaluation was a bit of a joke when I first put it on the agenda. Today, however, it
has become a regular annual item on the board agenda’’. Furthermore, 18% of the
supervisory board chairmen also witness a more cautious, pro-active and formal
Table 3 The implications for the supervisory board chairman (1997–2007)
Key changes role supervisory board chairmen Perceptions
chairmen (n = 22)
Perceptions
CEOs (n = 8)
1 The supervisory board chairman has become more visible
to society; more in a leadership role than in the past
19 (86.4%) 4 (50.0%)
2 The workload of the supervisory board chairman has
increased significantly; more intensive relationship with
the CEO
16 (72.7%) 3 (37.5%)
3 Stronger focus on board control and monitoring; less space
for intuition and chairman as a sparring partner/trusted
advisor
8 (36.4%) 5 (62.5%)
4 Better understanding of role expectations, involved risks
and need for board/personal accountability
6 (27.2%) 1 (12.5%)
5 More and earlier involvement in key strategic decision
making processes
6 (27.2%) 0 (0.0%)
6 More intensive communication with shareholder groups
and other stakeholders
6 (27.2%) 0 (0.0%)
7 Working style has become more cautious, formal and
pro-active; as reputation risks have increased significantly
4 (18.2%) 1 (12.5%)
8 Increased attention for the second echelon; next to attention
for the management board
3 (13.6%) 0 (0.0%)
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working style as a result of the increasing liabilities (implication 7). Finally, 10% of
the interviewees mention that the relationship of the chairman with the second
management echelon has intensified and chairmen do not focus solely on the
management board anymore (implication 8).
Although supervisory board chairmen observe the benefits of the increased level
and scope of their involvement, they are outspoken on potential disadvantages as
well. For instance, fifty per cent of the supervisory board chairmen consider laws
and regulations as an obstacle that may lead to risk-avoiding behavior: ‘‘I observe
that increasingly responsibilities are put on the plate of supervisors; I observe that
supervisors increasingly consult lawyers for legal advice’’, ‘‘SOX is a disaster and
the Dutch corporate governance code relies too much on the UK Combined Code’’
and ‘‘the focus on legal responsibilities is too strong; governing is no longer self-
evident’’. The remaining fifty per cent and most CEOs consider regulations to be a
useful guideline for the improvement of corporate governance. Furthermore,
directors mentioned that the intensified relationship between CEOs and chairmen
‘‘is based on a delicate balance’’ and that ‘‘there is of course a risk that matters will
be dealt with between the CEO and the supervisory board chairman too much on a
bilateral basis’’. One chairman summarized the impact of the increased challenges
and tensions as follows: ‘‘The best way to throw a magnificent career away is to
become chairman of a supervisory board’’. To conclude, it is noteworthy that CEOs
and chairmen seem to hint at different key implications. While CEOs emphasize the
stronger focus on board control and more limited space for sparring with board
chairmen, chairmen emphasize their increasing involvement in multiple areas, the
increasing work load and the professionalization of the supervisory board as a key
organizational body.
5.3 The (changing) structural position of supervisory board chairmen
(1997–2005)
As discussed in the previous two paragraphs, both CEOs and supervisory board
chairmen have witnessed significant changes in the Dutch corporate governance
context that have had a profound impact on the role of the supervisory board
chairmen. This raises the question as to how the structural position of board
chairmen (such as demographics, network position, board activities, remuneration
and turnover) has changed in the light of the environmental developments. Table 4
provides an overview of the evolving structural position of board chairmen. As
shown, the demographics of supervisory board chairmen have, in fact, not
significantly changed: a supervisory board chairman is typically around 65 years
old, has a tenure of some 9 years on the board, is male and is likely to have Dutch
nationality. However, the network position of supervisory board chairmen has
changed significantly: while chairmen on average held 1.94 other supervisory board
positions in 1997, this number decreased to 1.10 in 2005 (-43%). Similarly, the
average number of additional supervisory board chairmanships decreased from 0.58
in 1997 to 0.38 in 2005 (-35%).
At the organizational level, several structural changes are visible. First, the
number of board activities in which board chairmen are involved has significantly
The changing role of the supervisory board chairman 47
123
changed over time: the number of board meetings has increased from 6.5 a year in
1997 to 8.3 a year in 2005 (?27%) and the number of board committees of the
board has increased from 0.7 in 1997 to 2.0 in 2005 (?193%). The increasing
workload is reflected in the remuneration policies of companies as the average cash
salary of board chairmen has increased from €25,400 in 1997 to €56,000 in 2005
(?82%; inflation-adjusted). Simultaneously, the average level of turnover among
supervisory board chairmen increased significantly: while 6 supervisory board
chairmen were replaced in 1997, 18 board chairmen left their company in 2005
(?200%) in the top 100 listed corporations. In sum, the empirical results suggest
that while the ongoing developments in the Dutch corporate governance context
have coincided with higher levels of cash payment, more turnover and less
additional supervisory board positions, board chairmen demographics, such as their
age, tenure, gender and nationality, remained quite stable during our observation
horizon.
6 Discussion and conclusion
Over the last decade, the corporate governance context in most Western countries
has been changing rapidly and intensively (e.g., Ingley and Van Der Walt 2005;
Kiel and Nicholson 2003; Yoshikawa et al. 2007). Generally, scholars have shown
that these changes had a significant impact on the ‘‘checks and balances’’ and role of
different stakeholders. In this paper, we have discussed the impact of institutional
Table 4 The structural position of the supervisory board chairman (1997–2005)
Chairman’s demographics 1997 2001 2005 % change
Average age (years) 63.95 64.02 65.60 ?2.6 (p = .145)
Average Tenure (years) 9.84 9.68 9.03 -8.2 (p = .246)
Gender (% male) 99 100 100 ?1.0 (p = .320)
Nationality (% Dutch) 96 92 94 -2.1 (p = .312)
Chairman’s network
Number of other supervisory board positions
at top-100 listed firms
1.94 1.45 1.10 -43.4* (p = .000)
Number of other chairmanships at top-100 listed
firms
0.58 0.44 0.38 -34.5 (p = .002)
Chairman’s board activities
Number of board meetings 6.51 7.50 8.27 ?27.0* (p = .000)
Number of board committees 0.67 1.04 1.96 ?192.5* (p = .000)
Miscellaneous
Average amount of cash remuneration €25.350 €34.580 €56.000 ?120.9*a (p = .001)
Average level of turnover (%) 6 12 18 ?200.0* (p = .000)
* T-test shows that the difference is statistically significant at the p = 0.05 level
a Inflation-corrected % change in cash remuneration = 81.9*
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change on the role and position of the chairman on Dutch supervisory boards. A
combination of thirty semi-structured interviews with supervisory board chairmen
and CEOs, and archival data on the structural position of chairmen within the top-
100 listed firms in the Netherlands, revealed that their role has been in transition
during the period 1997–2007. Triggered by more regulation, greater influence of
(activist) shareholders, corporate governance scandals and increasing convergence
of the one-tier and two-tier board models, supervisory board chairmen have become
more involved in their control and service roles. Interestingly, the opinions
regarding the desirability of the evolving role of board chairmen varied widely
within our sample. This development has also coincided with an increased workload
(more board committees and meetings) resulting in fewer other board positions
(interlocks), more cash remuneration and higher levels of chairman turnover during
our observation window. At the same time, the demographic profile of chairmen has
remained unaltered during the last decade.
The changing level and scope of the involvement of supervisory board chairmen
has three major implications. First, greater societal expectations pose new
challenges to board chairmen as they operate beyond their traditional roles and
legal requirements in the two-tier model. In particular, supervisory board chairmen
are increasingly challenged to combine the seemingly conflicting demands of
control (such as independence, distance, and focus on the prevention of managerial
opportunism) and service (i.e., interdependence, closeness, and focus on value
creation) in their role fulfillment (Forbes and Milliken 1999; Van Hamel et al. 1998;
Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003). However, Dutch corporate law does not provide
clear guidance on this matter. As a consequence, supervisory board chairmen
increasingly operate in a grey area in which their independent non-executive
position is at stake. The tensions between the new expectations of chairmen and the
regulatory context manifest themselves especially in the ongoing national debate
whether or not to employ the one-tier board model as a legal alternative to the two-
tier board model in the Netherlands. Second, the combination of increased
workloads and liabilities for supervisory board chairmen is putting more pressure on
supervisory board chairmen and the pool of willing and qualified future candidates.
While the unchanged demographics suggest that firms are still searching for
supervisory board chairman with the same background and demographic profile, the
developments may provide opportunities for executive search firms. Their services
may become more valuable as it may be more difficult for corporations to find
qualified candidates who are able to perform multiple roles. The need for such firms
to provide aid in educating and evaluating supervisory board chairmen may increase
as well. In this context, it can be expected that the market for directors will lead to a
professionalization of the function of the board chairman (Peij 2005; Schilling
2001). Third, while the growing involvement of the supervisory board chairman
may have a positive impact on the functioning of the board of directors and
corporate performance, this development may also have negative consequences.
The emphasis on board control, compliance, and shareholder value may result in
more risk-averse behavior, more focus on short term efficiency and less a focus on
innovation, R&D and strategic renewal (Hendry and Kiel 2004; Sundaramurthy and
Lewis 2003). Furthermore, the decreasing network connectivity of supervisory
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board chairmen may limit the number of learning opportunities for firms. Both
social network theory and resource dependency theory have emphasized that board
ties are an important learning vehicle through which firms can tap into the
knowledge base of interlocking partners (Boyd 1990; Mizruchi 1996; Westphal
et al. 2001) and are useful devices to co-opt resources from the environment on
which corporations are dependent (Mizruchi 1996; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).
Board chairmen and regulatory bodies should be aware of these positive and
negative consequences of the contemporary corporate governance developments
and should take them into account in their role fulfillment.
The study has several limitations, but also provides avenues for future research.
First, this study has treated all supervisory board chairmanships similarly in order to
establish a general trend. However, the changing role of the supervisory board
chairman may be contingent on the specifics of a firm’s internal and external
context. For example, future studies could investigate how a firm’s size, ownership
structure (family versus dispersed ownership), network structure (peripheral versus
central network position) and international exposure affect the extent to which the
role of the supervisory board chairman has changed as a result of national and
international corporate governance developments. Furthermore, in line with our
choice for the individual as the unit of analysis, the evolving role of the board
chairman might be contingent on a chairman’s background, i.e., his/her status,
professional training and experience. Second, the study has remained silent on the
impact of the changing role of the board chairman on board processes, boards’ task
performance and corporate performance (Hambrick et al. 2008; Huse 2005, 2007;
Pugliese et al. 2009). Ideally, future research could examine these issues by taking a
longitudinal and multi-level approach, i.e., an in-depth investigation of the
individual and group behavior of directors during an extensive time period. Third,
the evolving role of the supervisory board chairman may be contingent on the Dutch
context. Future research studies could examine to which extent the similar
developments are observable in other countries with a two-tier board model (for
instance, Austria and Germany) and in countries with mixed board models (for
instance, Denmark, France, Italy and Macedonia). The growing popularity and use
of ‘lead directors’ on one-tier boards suggest that the observed trend may actually be
part of a two-way convergence of board models. Fourth, given the exploratory
nature and relatively limited number of study participants, a total of thirty board
members were selected through convenience sampling, our empirical findings
should be interpreted with care. Future research at a larger scale is necessary to
confirm the observed developments.
Our study has shown that the role of the supervisory board chairman is
undergoing significant changes in the Netherlands. The changing role expectations
pose new challenges and provide new opportunities for managers and supervisory
board members, shareholders, regulators and executive search firms. In particular,
regulators are being confronted with shareholder and societal expectations that go
beyond the legal possibilities that exist in the two-tier board model. And last but not
least, supervisory board chairmen are facing the challenge to manage the increasing
complexity and conflicting stakeholder expectations. The future will show how
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supervisory board chairmen will cope with these tensions and to what extent their
role will converge to that of the ‘‘one tier board chairman’’.
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Appendix A
See Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5 Overview interviewed supervisory board members
Willy Angenent Chairman of the supervisory boards of Vedior NV and FMO
Adri Baan Chairman of the supervisory boards of AFM, Hagemeyer NV,
Wolters Kluwer NV and Volker Wessels BV
Jan-Diederik Bax Chairman of the supervisory boards of Vopak NV and Smit Internationale NV
Rob van den Bergh Former CEO of VNU NV and multiple supervisory board positions
Henk Bodt Former CEO of ASML NV and multiple supervisory board positions
Rene Dahan Chairman of the supervisory board of Ahold NV
J. Fokko van Duyne Chairman of the supervisory boards of Gamma NV, OPG NV
and De Nederlandsche Bank
Cor Herkstro¨ter Chairman of the supervisory board of DSM NV
Paul van den Hoek Chairman of the supervisory boards of ASMI NV, Buhrmann NV,
Robeco NV and Wavin NV
Jan Hommen Chairman of the (supervisory) boards of ING NV, TNT NV and Reed Elsevier NV
Jan Kalff Chairman of the supervisory boards of Stork NV and Schiphol Group NV
Wim de Kleuver Chairman of the supervisory board of Philips NV
Gert-Jan Kramer Former CEO of Fugro NV and multiple supervisory board positions
Cees van Lede Chairman of the supervisory board of Heineken NV and
Sare Lee/De International BV
Aarnout Loudon Former chairman of the supervisory boards of ABN Amro NV and Akzo Nobel NV
Floris Maljers Former chairman of the supervisory boards of Philips NV and VendexKBB NV
Rinus Minderhoud Chairman of the supervisory board of Getronics NV
Ton Risseeuw Chairman of the supervisory boards of KPN NV and Intergamma BV
Willem Stevens Multiple supervisory board positions
Jaap Vink Chairman of the supervisory board of Samas NV
Rob Zwartendijk Chairman of the supervisory boards of Numico NV, Nutreco NV and Blokker BV
One non-executive director is not identified by name. Not all current and former board positions of
participants are listed
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